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Abstract: Carruthers’s argument depends on viewing logical form as a lin-
guistic level. But logical form is typically viewed as underpinning general
purpose inference, and hence as having no particular connection to lan-
guage processing. If logical form is tied directly to language, two problems
arise: a logical problem concerning language acquisition and the empiri-
cal problem that aphasics appear capable of cross-modular reasoning.
Let us assume, with Carruthers, that there is an internal language
in terms of which domain-general reasoning is conducted (fol-
lowing Fodor [1975], call it the language of thought – LOT). Nat-
ural language must clearly interface with such an internal lan-
guage: That is, language understanding must involve translating
from natural language to LOT, and language production must in-
volve the reverse.
What might LOT be like? The standard assumption is that LOT
must be a logical language, that is, a language over which logical
(or more precisely proof-theoretic) operations can be defined (see
Fodor 1975; Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988). Accordingly, for each nat-
ural language sentence, there will a corresponding a “logical form”
– in the traditional formal semantic sense. (Typically, there will be
several such logical forms, because of ambiguities in natural lan-
guage; and the picture is further complicated by anaphora, deixis,
etc., but in ways irrelevant to the present argument.) The project
of formal semantics (Dowty et al. 1981) seeks to explicate the re-
lationship between natural sentences and their putative logical
forms; and logical form has, of course, been a central notion in an-
alytic philosophy and linguistics. The advocate of LOT typically
takes a “psychologistic” view of logical form – logical forms corre-
spond to representations of sentences in LOT. (One might query
whether inference can be captured by logical reasoning alone –
but this is another issue; see Oaksford & Chater [1991; 1998].)
Carruthers points out that Chomsky (1995) argues that there is
a level of linguistic representation (called logical form, or LF). He
then claims that all domain-general propositional thought is
framed in terms of these LF representations. It is in this sense, he
argues, that language has a cognitive function: a linguistic level of
representation, LF, that plays an essential role in domain-general
thought.
The interest of this claim seems to hinge on terminology: It
seems to be crucial that logical form is viewed as a linguistic level
of representation. Then, one may say that thought has, in a sense,
a linguistic basis, and therefore that language has a cognitive func-
tion. If, however, we described LF as, say, a logical level of repre-
sentation, then there would be no tendency to claim that thoughts
(framed in LF) have a linguistic basis; or that language thereby has
a cognitive function.
Carruthers’s assumptions concerning LF are, as far as I can see,
precisely the standard ones described above – natural language is
translated in and out of LF; and LF is the representation over
which domain-general inferences are defined. Thus, LF seems
not to serve as a linguistic level of representation – but as a level
of representation for general cognition; although one that must 
interface with natural language, as it must with perceptual input
systems and motor output systems. In particular, from what 
Carruthers says about LF, it seems quite conceivable that, for 
example, LF developmentally and evolutionarily precedes the de-
velopment of external natural language. As it happens, Chomsky
(1995) has a specific theory of LF, which differs in a number of
ways from standard views of logical form, but features specific to
Chomsky’s notion are not discussed in, and are therefore presum-
ably not critical to, Carruthers’s argument.
In a nutshell, advocates of LOT typically think of LOT as ex-
pressing the logical form of natural language sentences and
thereby serving as a basis for inference. Carruthers does not ap-
pear to add substantive assumptions that establish any further
sense in which logical form is fundamentally a linguistic style of
representation. But without such assumptions, it seems inappro-
priate to draw conclusions about the putative cognitive function
of language, which might more neutrally be viewed as concerning
the putative cognitive functions of LOT.
One could imagine strengthening Carruthers’s claim in the fol-
lowing way: Suppose that logical form representations can only
be entertained if (at least in principle) the cognitive system can
derive syntactic and phonological representations corresponding
to the logical form representation (which, in principle, might
mean something like “given appropriate cognitive resources”).
Then the linguistic abilities of language users (their phonological
and syntactic capacities) will strikingly constrain their powers 
of domain general reasoning. According to this view, logical form
representations will necessarily be constrained, in evolution and
development, by the development of language abilities; people
with impaired linguistic abilities will necessarily have impaired
general reasoning abilities; and so on. By making this strong 
connection with other levels of linguistic representation, the lin-
guistic character of logical form representation is given real sub-
stance.
But this viewpoint, though substantive, seems difficult to de-
fend. One problem is logical. As Fodor (1980; 1981) points out, if
thought is bounded by language, then language learning is im-
possible. This is because language learning requires framing hy-
potheses about the meaning of linguistic forms that have not yet
been mastered – and this requires being able to entertain mean-
ings for which a current linguistic representation is not available.
But this is precisely what is precluded on the view just described:
that logical form representations are only available where the cor-
responding phonological and syntactic representations can be
constructed. A second empirical problem is presented by patients
with severe aphasia, who can carry out numerous complex tasks.
For example, as Carruthers notes, an aphasic studied by Varley
(1998; 2002) can, among many other things, pass the false belief
task. From a modularist’s perspective, this requires at least the in-
tegration of visual modules (viewing and understanding the ex-
perimental setting) and social reasoning modules (concerning be-
liefs and related notions) and hence is a paradigm example of
cross-modal reasoning.
One might, though, defend the claim that conscious proposi-
tional thought necessarily implicates language. Indeed, it seems to
me that this claim is almost certainly right. Conscious awareness
seems to be limited to perceptual inputs (broadly construed to in-
clude awareness of bodily state, motor activity, pain, etc.) and their
imagistic analogues (visual, auditory images). The only way of
turning propositional thought into a form that allows it to be per-
ceived (or imaged) appears to be to turn it into a linguistic form.
Natural language is arguably the only means we have of externally
representing propositional thought; if we can only be conscious of
that which can (potentially) be externally represented (i.e., per-
ceived and imaged), then natural language must inevitably un-
derpin conscious thought.
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